Revising or Amending the New York State Constitution
Article XIX of the New York Constitution makes provision for four ways to change the fundamental governing document of the state, two for amendment and two for revision. Specific targeted change of a single provision is generally characterized as an “amendment.” More comprehensive change of large portions of the document, or the entire document, is generally characterized as a “revision.”
Amendment of the New York State constitution may occur either upon legislative initiative, or upon the recommendation of a constitutional convention. The convention route has not been used for targeted amendment in the modern history of New York. When the legislative route is used, in the manner detailed below, there is no requirement for gubernatorial approval of a constitutional amendment.
Revision of the constitution is achieved through calling a constitutional convention. A convention may be called either by the legislature or by the people. The legislature may call a convention at any time. The current state constitution requires that a statewide referendum be held automatically, every twenty years, on whether a constitutional convention should be held. This referendum question will next be on the ballot in November 2017.
The State Constitution Doesn’t Always Mean What It Says; Perhaps It Should
The Court of Appeals, our highest court, is now considering a claim (Bordeleau v. State of New York) that most of New York’s economic development practices violate plain language in the state’s constitution. At issue is the constitutional prohibition against providing gifts or loans of state money or credit to benefit private parties. (Article VII. Section 8).
[See the oral arguments here: http://politicalclassdismissed.com/?p=12591.]
The state’s defense it that it is not really making gifts or loans within the meaning of the constitution; it is contracting for deliverables that benefit the New York economy. The Attorney General’s office also distinguishes actions of the state public authorities’ actions from those of the state itself. But it really boils down to this: New York came to believe that it could not accept 19th century constitutional limits and still compete economically in a 21st century world. So paths around the constitutional restriction were found. And now – because of a straightforward “it means what it says” Appellate Division decision on a case brought by some pesky Tea Party activists – the resultant policies must be defended.
There are many other examples of New York policy makers finding ways around inconvenient constitutional requirements. To cite just two:
- The referendum requirement for borrowing (Article VII, section 11) has not kept us from finding ways around voter approval, and becoming one the most heavily indebted states in the nation.
- The requirement that a bill “ripen” on legislators’ desks for three days before any vote except in emergencies has little force (Article III, section 14), as governors find “emergencies” whenever politically useful.
Not all the opacity of the state constitution can be traced to actions by state government to bypass it. Sometimes it is preemptive federal decisions that have emptied state constitutional provisions of meaning. So:
- We have everything-goes Native American gaming in New York (Article I. section 9), notwithstanding our constitutional gambling prohibition.
- We have a nightmarishly complex state legislature redistricting provision (Article III, section 4), with some parts rendered null and void on federal constitutional grounds, and some still in force.
Of course, though the causes are federal, the state legislature has done nothing to clean up the document in these two key areas. (Neither has a series of governors, but they are less culpable. The executive has no formal role in amending the constitution.)
Amidst all the ingenuity that’s been harnessed to overcome some of the limits on the legislature the state constitution, the parts of the document that have remained unchallenged are instructive. The